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National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) was a 58-page top secret policy paper by the United States National Security Council presented to President Harry S. Truman on April 14, 1950. It was one of the most important statements of American policy in the Cold War. In the words of scholar Ernest R. May, NSC-68 "provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s." NSC-68 and its subsequent amplifications advocated a large expansion in the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military aid to allies of the United States. It made the containment of global Communist expansion a high priority. NSC-68 rejected the alternative policies of friendly détente or aggressive rollback of the Soviet Union.〔Walter L. Hixson, "What Was the Cold War and How Did We Win It?" ''Reviews in American History'' (1994) 22#3 pp. 507-511 (in JSTOR )〕 ==Historical background== By 1950, events dictated the need to examine U.S. national security policies: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was operational; military assistance for European allies had begun; the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb; and the communists had solidified their control of China. With the threat of communism to the U.S. and its allies expanding, on 31 January 1950 President Truman directed the Department of State and Department of Defense "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." A State-Defense Policy Review Group was set up under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze of the State Department.〔Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., ''NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment'', (Brief Chronology ), pp. 17–9.〕 The Defense Department representatives on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the existing $12.5 billion ceiling on defense spending.〔Block, Fred L. "( The Origins of International... )" Google Books. 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.〕 The report, known as NSC-68, was requested by NSC Study Group * Paul Nitze, Chair * John P. Davis * Robert Tufts * Robert Hooker * Dean Acheson * Chip Bohlen * Major General Truman Landon, Joint Chiefs Representative * Samuel S. Butano * Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense Originally, President Truman did not support NSC-68 when it was brought to him in 1950. He believed that it was not specific about which programs would be affected or changed and it also didn't go well with his previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951.〔Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., (''NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment'' ), p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994. Google Books, 23 Apr. 2009〕 The document outlined the de facto national security strategy of the United States for that time (though it was not an official NSS in the form we know today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints. The NSC-68 described the challenges facing the United States in cataclysmic terms. "The issues that face us are momentous," the document stated, "involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「NSC-68」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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